Barry has recently successfully represented a Social Worker before the Conduct and Competence Committee of the Health and Care Professions Council. His client faced serious allegations of malpractice in relation to the care of a vulnerable child and allegations of incompetence. Following a four day hearing, his client was cleared of all bar one contested factual allegations, and the Panel found that on the evidence his client’s fitness to practice was not impaired. Barry was instructed by Thompsons Solicitors @thompsonslaw @furnivallaw
Barry Smith's client, one of six Southern Health registrants, successfully has his fitness to practice found to be not impaired after a three-month NMC tribunal. He was instructed by Emma Hulme of Thompsons Solicitors.
Following a 6 week trial at the Wood Green Crown Court, Barry Smith's client was found not guilty of involvement in a £1m excise duty fraud following a lengthy investigation and HMRC prosecution led by Queen's Counsel.
Barry was pleased to work with Phil Blackburn of Cobleys Solicitors on this instruction.
When a professional client is brought before their regulator, it is not uncommon for it to be the last in a number of hearings considering the same allegations, such as those held by their employer, concurrent criminal proceedings, or a coroner's inquest. This article considers the situations in which the judgments and findings of such hearings may be admissible before a professional disciplinary tribunal where they are not automatically admissible, such as is often the case with criminal convictions.
WHEN A JUDGMENT MAY BE ADMISSIBLE
A general principle exists that judgments in other proceedings are not admissible evidence: Hollington v F. Hewthorn & Co.  KB 587.
R (Squier) v GMC  EWHC 299 (Admin), however, is authority for the proposition that related judgments may be admissible in professional disciplinary proceedings where the judgment is adduced to evidence of background facts and to give context. At para. [39-40], per by Ouseley J, the authorities on this point were reviewed and it was held that (emphasis added):
”In the light of those authorities, the FTPP did not act unreasonably in concluding that the judgments would be relevant in providing an insight into the background to the cases and the forensic context in which Dr Squire prepared to the cases and the forensic context in which Dr Squier prepared and gave her evidence, and in providing prima facie evidence of facts about the circumstances of the deaths, the post-mortems, what the parents said, and the medical issues faced at trials to which the Dr. Squier’s evidence was relevant…”
“The FTPP did not decide that the judgments were to be admitted to prove the cause of death; that is not an issue for the FTPP. They are not relevant to prove that Dr Squier's evidence was not accepted or was found to be lacking in certain qualities. The issue before the FTPP is not whether Dr Squier was right or wrong which was the issue before the judges, but concerns the basis upon which she gave her evidence, its scope and her use of the underlying research papers. That is the crucial issue for the FTPP. The actual outcome of the trials, and any finding in or inferred from the redacted judgments that Dr Squier's evidence was rejected, is not relevant to these allegations of misconduct...”
The following passage warns against the dangers of the admission of evidence on the crucial issues where the charges have been otherwise adversely determined against a registrant at an earlier stage (para. ):
“It may also be unfair for the judgments to be a significant influence on the mind of the tribunal on the crucial issues before it for the same reasons.”
At para.  it was held that:
"It is not unfair for the judgments to be admitted... The FTPP must find for itself the facts necessary to reach a conclusion on the quality of the expert evidence given by Dr Squier in the light of the allegations as to its shortcomings, and the evidence before the FTPP. The FTPP should be very careful to avoid any actual or inferred findings of the judges on the quality of Dr Squier's evidence being used as evidence of the truth of the allegations, because that risks substituting another body for its functions. And its task is not that of the judges in those cases; the issues crucially are different, as are the parties and the evidence which it will have to consider."
At para.  it was held that:
“The judgments, as redacted, do not include findings on the allegations which it is for the FTPP to decide. They provide background, context and proof of what I would expect to be often non-contentious matters. The FTPP has to find the allegation proved by the GMC on the evidence that the scope and content of Dr Squier's expert evidence was below the standard required of an expert; the allegations are not that the evidence was wrong, or rejected by the judges.”
This case followed GMC v Meadow  EWCA Civ 1390 in which it was held that it may be important for an FTP Panel when considering alleged misconduct of an expert witness to be aware of the context in which evidence was given in previous proceedings.
LIMITATIONS OF SQUIER
In Enemuwe v NMC  EWHC 2081 it was held by Holman J that the NMC should not have been allowed to rely on adverse findings in a report of a Supervisor of Midwives on the same issues that were said to amount to professional misconduct. Notwithstanding that Squier allowed earlier judgments to be admissible as 'prima-facie evidence' (para. , above) Enemuwe distinguished Squier at para  to :
“It seems to me that the circumstances and forensic context with which Ouseley J was concerned, and in which prospectively the FTPP of the General Medical Council will look, or may look, at redacted versions of the judgments, is analytically different from what is in point and issue in the present case.
In that case, the essential task of the judges had been to decide what the facts were in relation to the deaths of the children. That was completely different from the essential task prospectively of the FTPP, which is to consider allegations with regard to the professionalism of Dr Squier as a person giving expert evidence.
In the present case, however, the supervisory investigation report of Ms 2 and the role and task of the Committee at the fact-finding stage of their hearing was in fact identical, namely to decide whether or not the Appellant had said or done the various things alleged against her.”
Accordingly, the situations in which earlier judgments can be adduced under the principle in Squier should be narrowly defined, and it is important to look at the reasons behind why a regulator might wish to adduce an earlier judgment against a registrant.
HIGH COURT TRIALS AND FINDINGS OF DISHONESTY
A question arises as to the extent to which a related judgment can be relied on as prima-facie evidence of matters of fact in issue. To that end, the Court in Squier considered an older case of Spackman v GMC  AC 627 in which the GMC relied on a Divorce Court finding of adultery as prima facie evidence of the adultery itself. It should be noted that technically Spackman is obiter on this point; the point to be decided in that case was whether the tribunal erred in not allowing rebuttal evidence to be adduced on behalf of the doctor.
It is of note that Lord Atkin in Spackman held that (at p634):
‘It is not disputed that where there has been a trial, at least before a High Court judge, the notes of the evidence at such a trial and the judgment of the judge may afford prima facie evidence in support of the charge, for the council are not obliged to hear evidence on oath, but the very conception of prima facie evidence involves the opportunity of controverting it …. '.
It can be argued, therefore, that the effect Spackman should be limited to trials which have been heard at High Court level and above. The context in which this is most likely to be relevant is where a civil court makes a finding of dishonesty against a legal professional in the course of proceedings.
To that end, in Constantinides v The Law Society  EWHC 725 (Admin) it was held by Moses LJ that at para. :
“The judgment was admissible to prove background facts in the context of which the appellant’s misconduct had to be considered. But that was the limit of its function, in the particular circumstances of this case. The judge’s views as to the appellant’s dishonesty and lack of integrity were not admissible to prove the Law Society’s case against this appellant. There will be cases when a finding of fact, be it in a civil or criminal case, of dishonesty will be prima facie evidence of that dishonesty. But in the instant case the judge’s conclusions were far more wide ranging than the allegations made against the appellant in the disciplinary proceedings. They were not relied upon by the Law Society as proof of dishonesty. At paragraph 21 it was recorded that the Law Society only intended to rely upon the judge’s description of the appellant’s behavior and to limit the references to the allegations made in the disciplinary proceedings.’
In Georgieva v NMC  GWD 11-156 it was held that a decision of a Registrar’s Appeal Hearing could be placed into evidence before an Investigating Committee, but at para.  it is clear that it was only admissible, and to a limited extent, because (per Sheriff Welsh QC):
‘In my opinion it was relevant to the general background of the case … Had the Investigating Committee used the Registrar’s Appeal Hearing decision as a material building block in the construction of its own decision that too would have been unlawful’.
Georgieva v NMC  GWD 11-156 approved Constantinides to the extent that the judgment was admissible ‘to prove background facts’ (at para.  per Sheriff T Welsh QC). It follows that admissibility as 'prima-facie evidence' as set out in Squier and Constantinides should be only considered appropriate in limited circumstances.
Particular care should be given if a regulator seeks to adduce the findings of an inquest against a registrant.
Inquest findings may be admissible at the review level of a regulator prior to submission to a disciplinary tribunal for final determination according to guidance approved in Woods v GMC  EWHC 1484:
1. In conduct cases the PPC’s task is to decide whether, in its opinion, there is a real prospect of serious professional misconduct being established before the PCC…..
…in performing its task the PPC:
(5) should proceed with particular caution in reaching a decision to halt a complaint when the decision may be perceived as inconsistent with a decision made by another public body with medical personnel or input (for example, an NHS body, a Coroner or an Ombudsman) in relation to the same or substantially the same facts and, if it does reach such a decision, should give reasons for any apparent inconsistency;”
However, this does not mean that they will be admissible in determining final charges against a registrant, as this would fall foul of the observations of the High Court in the cases set out earlier in this article.
The admissibility of an inquest verdict was considered in the context of a claim for breach articles 2 and 3 European Convention on Human Rights in Daniel v St. George's Healthcare NHS Trust  EWHC 23 (QB). At para.  it was observed by Lang J that:
"...evidence called at the Inquest differed from the evidence adduced in this trial, which could potentially make a material difference to the conclusions which this court could properly reach. Moreover, an inquest verdict is not intended to form the basis of a finding in a civil claim - section 10(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 provides that a determination at an inquest may not be framed in such a way as to appear to determine any question of civil liability."
This, again, tends to suggest that an inquest finding should not be admissible against a registrant in professional disciplinary proceedings.
The above cases suggest that where a regulator seeks to adduce a judgment or other finding against a registrant in professional disciplinary proceedings it is essential to ask why the judgment is being adduced. It may be admissible as evidence of general background and context, such as where the conduct of a legal professional or expert witness is called in to question. It should not, however, be adduced as evidence to support a finding of fact against a registrant where the earlier finding is on the same issues as the allegation the registrant faces.
The Court of Appeal has ruled in R. v Cole  EWCA Crim 888 that when the Prosecution apply under section 22 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for a Defendant's available amount to be reconsidered in respect of a historic confiscation order, it was wrong to not give consideration to the a change in the law which post-dated the original confiscation order (at para. ). The change of the law in this case was the effect of the Supreme Court judgment in R. v Waya  UKSC 51 in calculating the benefit figure in cases of mortgage fraud.
The Court rejected the argument that there had been undue delay in making the application around 3 years after the original confiscation order was made (at para. [42, 43]).
The Court also confirmed at para.  an earlier authority of Oyebola  EWCA Crim 1052 in which it was held that where a property is obtained through fraud and is subsequently rented out, that rental income is properly included in the benefit figure calculation as the proceeds of crime. The Court rejected a novel argument that the income was no longer the proceeds of crime because the lender, for commercial reasons, had continued the arrangement, notwithstanding the original fraud (at para. [37, 38, 56]. The Court therefore rejected an appeal of a later confiscation order made against this defendant.
Barry Smith was instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service in this appeal. For full details, see the original judgment.
Professional clients may find themselves facing both civil and criminal proceedings on the same issue and this can create particular difficulties for them. If concurrent civil, criminal and or regulatory proceedings are a possibility, then it is important that the client has a legal team that understands the broader legal context of any litigation they face.
A good example of when concurrent civil and criminal proceedings can be problematic can be found in the context of investigations by HMRC. Following a detailed investigation, HMRC may launch criminal proceedings which, by their nature, can last some time before they are concluded. At the same time, if cash has been recovered in the investigation then HMRC may apply to the Magistrates' Court for the cash to be surrendered under the civil cash forfeiture provisions.
Following a police investigation it is common for cash forfeiture proceedings to be adjourned pending the outcome of a criminal trial. The reasons for this are simple: firstly, in the event of a conviction it is likely that cash forfeiture proceedings will not be contested, saving time and money for the applicant. Secondly, the applicant will not want to do anything in the civil proceedings which might jeopardise the criminal trial.
However, a new approach by HMRC has led to them seeking to complete civil cash forfeiture proceedings whilst criminal proceedings are ongoing, citing a backlog of cases that they wish to conclude. This can lead to many problems for the respondent to such an application, such as the fact that they are likely to need to give detailed evidence under oath as to the alleged criminality at a much earlier stage than criminal proceedings would have required them to. This is also likely to be before proper disclosure has been made by the prosecutor of any material that might assist them. Any concessions made by a respondent in this situation in cross-examination are likely to be used against them in the criminal trial.
Generally speaking, criminal lawyers have relied on the case of R. v Payton  EWCA Crim 1226 to support applications to adjourn civil proceedings pending the outcome of a concurrent criminal case. In that case, Pill L.J. held that:
'It is accepted that 'close liaison' would be expected between investigators in the civil and in the criminal proceedings. It is submitted that 'the overwhelming likelihood is that the police would lodge an application for forfeiture (and so effect the detention of the cash and the preservation of the status quo) but then seek an adjournment of the application until criminal proceedings (including any appeal) are concluded'" .
'It is, however, important that care is taken to ensure that the fair trial of a defendant is not prejudiced by anything arising in civil proceedings in the magistrates' court and steps should be taken accordingly' .
More recently, HMRC have deployed the subsequent Court of Appeal authority of Mote v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  EWCA Civ 1324 to support the progression of civil cash forfeiture despite the existence of a parallel criminal case. In Mote, having considered Payton, Richards L.J. held that the fact that the prosecution would receive an opportunity to rehearse their case did not in of itself give rise to any serious prejudice to a respondent:
'In general, as it seems to me, the fact that the prosecution has had a previous opportunity to rehearse its case cannot be said to give rise to substantial prejudice to the defendant in a subsequent criminal trial. If it were otherwise, it would provide a ground of objection to a retrial in criminal proceedings where the jury have been unable to agree in the first trial or where a conviction in the first trial has been quashed on appeal. If this were a point of substance, I would also expect it to have been mentioned in the previous cases.' .
Accordingly, practitioners who wish to adjourn civil proceedings pending the conclusion of criminal proceedings would be well advised to identify a clear and specific prejudice to their client beyond the fact that their client would be at jeopardy of giving evidence twice on the same facts. This is particularly so under the new culture of the criminal courts which expects defendants to outline their case in detail at a much earlier stage that was previously required.
Effective from 1 February 2018, the Bar Adjudication and Tribunals Service has published new sanctions guidance for barristers found to have breached the Bar Standards Board Handbook.
Changes include new guidance on Misconduct of a Sexual Nature.
The full document can be found here: https://www.tbtas.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/BTAS-Sanctions-Guidance-2018.pdf
Following a four day hearing before the Conduct and Competence Committee of the Health and Care Professions Council, Barry's client, a paramedic, was cleared of an allegation of sexual assault. Barry was instructed by Thompsons Solicitors.
Following an extensive investigation of his client, Barry Smith was instructed by David Fendt of Edwin Coe LLP to defend a prosecution brought against a former Company Director by the Insolvency Service following the collapse of his employment companies. After a period of negotiation with the Insolvency Service and a full analysis of the underlying evidence, he was able to achieve a suspended sentence for his client despite the case involving £4 million worth of transactions and substantial liabilities to creditors remaining.
Following a reference from a High Court Judge, in December 2017 Barry Smith successfully prosecuted two brothers for perjury arising out of protracted and high profile family proceedings. Barry was instructed by the CPS.
In October 2017 Barry Smith successfully prosecuted a well-publicised divorcee on benefit and legal aid fraud allegations which arose out of contracted and high profile divorce proceedings. He was instructed by the CPS fraud division.
In October 2017 Barry Smith was instructed by Shanaz Patel of City Criminal Lawyers, Leicester, to defend Mason Casey on allegations of murder. Barry was led by Robert Woodcock, Red Lion Chambers.